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“A matter of man to man”. Moral obligations, political loyalty and clientelism in Corsica 
Jean-Louis BRIQUET, CNRS, Paris  
 
 
This seminar gives me the opportunity to present a research I’ve conducted in the late 1990s 
on political clientelism in Corsica – not only to present this research, but also to revisit it in 
the light of the topic of this seminar: that is the question of “honour” and the cultural codes 
linked to “honour” in Mediterranean societies. 
 
First, I must say that “honour” was not a key notion in this research. I was quiet reluctant to 
use a category stressing on the “traditional” aspects of Mediterranean societies – and 
especially a category as “honour” related to an alleged homogeneous and conventional 
“Mediterranean culture”. In Corsica, clientelism is deeply rooted inside modern political 
institutions (political parties, state agencies, local bureaucracies). So, my aim was to 
understand in what manner the clientelistic networks and exchanges have adapted to the 
political modernisation of Corsican society : to analyse the way in which the process of 
implementation of modern state and of representative democracy since the last decades of 
the 19th century has led to the establishment and consolidation of clientelistic networks and 
exchanges – and, at the same time, the way in which such networks and exchanges have 
been reshaped with the expansion of the state intervention (public policies, welfare), and 
the development of mass political parties. In this perspective, clientelism could be viewed as 
a product of political modernisation (a channel through which modern political institutions 
have been concretely established in Corsica), and not as a residual expression of traditional 
values – as, for example, “amoral familism” (to use a term forged by Edward Banfield in 
order to explain the indifference of Italian peasants for public affairs and politics, when 
these one doesn’t regard their own material benefits) ; or as “parochial political culture” 
producing mistrust of politics, lack of civicness, and fostering political patronage (as Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba wrote in their book The civic culture, and as it has been recently 
reformulated and renovated by Robert Putnam in Making democracy works). 
 
But, despite this “reluctance”, I faced something related to “honour” during my fieldwork, 
especially when I tried to understand how people I interviewed (local politicians, political 
activists, or ordinary citizens) judged and evaluated the political relationships in which they 
were involved. Speaking about these relationships, about the role and behaviour of the main 
local politicians (the ruling class of the notables), about electoral choice and political loyalty, 
this people often used the language of “moral obligations”, “friendship”, “duty of 
reciprocity”, “sense of gratitude”, etc. From the point of view of their participants, the 
clientelistic links are not only based on material exchanges (political support in return for 
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goods and services); they are also based on what we can call a “moral economy of politics” 
(or a “moral politics” to be more simple) – that is moral considerations regarding how a 
politician has to act if he wants to have a “good reputation” among its electorate (and to 
receive votes and consideration); regarding the reasons why the voters have to be loyal to a 
politician (or, at the contrary, can remove his loyalty); regarding, in few words, what is a 
legitimate political relationship and political exchange. In this paper, I will describe this 
“moral politics” in the case of Corsica and the way in which it influences, on the one hand, 
the exercise and legitimization of political authority and, on the other hand, the conception 
of political commitment and loyalty among ordinary citizens. 
 
 
[1] 
 
The title of my paper comes from an interview with a local politician during my fieldwork. 
This politician was explaining to me what he considered to be the “peculiarity” of politics in 
Corsica, its very contrast to the “main politics” (grande politique) – the politics as it is 
performed in the “big cities” or in “France” (which means in this context the continental 
France in opposition to the island of Corsica). He said more precisely: “You know, here, we 
vote for men, not for ideas […] What counts is the man, the relationship one has with him, 
the relationship he has had with your family […]. Here, politics is a matter of man to man 
much more than of ideology”. Form him, this is a “good think”: “There is something noble [in 
this], a network of solidarity, trust and direct friendship with people”. 
 
According to this interview (and many others I can’t quote), the political affiliation results 
from personal links (friendship, solidarity, trust). Giving its vote to someone means much 
more than to express a political preference; it means to express an “authentic” bond 
between the voter and the candidate. An anecdote related to me by a regional politician is 
very significant in this regard. He was candidate in a local election, and a voter comes to him 
saying that it was in a difficult situation: he wanted to “give votes” to the regional politician 
(who had helped his son to get a job in the local administration and whose “family was very 
close to me and to my father”); but it was impossible for him to give all the votes of his 
family to the regional politician, because the other competitor in the election was one of his 
close relatives (his cousin, who had also “helped” his family). But the voter suggests a 
solution: “You know full well [he said to the regional politician] that all of us [the members of 
the family] can’t vote for you. But I’ll give you votes anyway”. And the family divides the 
votes of its 6 or 7 members between the regional politician and his opponent. In this case, 
voting is a very similar act to the gift analysed by Marcel Mauss: it demonstrates a “spiritual 
bond” between the voter and the politician; it is given as a testimony of a personal feeling 
and gratitude; and he creates mutual engagements and obligations. 
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[2] 
 
However, this “authentic” and personal bond is very equivocal. On the one hand, it is stated 
in terms of moral obligation and selflessness (the duty of friendship); on the other hand, it is 
sustained by material exchanges (the favours). Voting provides access to the resources the 
politician has to distribute to his supporters (jobs, public subsidies, administrative assistance, 
public work contracts, etc.); and receiving “favours” implies responding by political loyalty. 
As a voter I interviewed explained to me: “Imagine someone gives my son or my daughter a 
job. It bonds us […]. Well, you’re not going to spit in the face of someone who helped you; I 
think it’s something normal […]. When the favour is a big one, you can’t refuse the vote [for 
the politician who gave it], it bonds us, and I don’t want anyone saying I’m ungrateful”. 
Refusing to vote for someone who’s done a favour for oneself or for a member of one’s 
family is seen as a “betrayal”. It could be punished by a loss of reputation (“You can’t count 
on him”, “He is not grateful”), or by marginalisation from the solidarity networks linking 
people belonging to the same local “party”. At the same time, a promise not kept by a 
politician, a job not given, a favour refused, etc., can lead the voter to withdraw his support 
to the politician. A politician I’ve interviewed complained about this situation in these words: 
“It’s true that we have to do favours, but you are to be careful with favours, because favours 
are like an explosive bomb. You can gain twenty votes on one side if you find someone a job, 
but you can also lose forty on the other side […]. You can make some people unhappy, and 
they come and say to you: ‘What! We voted for you and you won’t give us anything’ […]. 
They feel tricked, and you lose forty votes…” 
 
Julian Pitt-Rivers pointed out this kind of ambiguity in friendship relationships in the Spanish 
village he studied in the late 1950. He noted that friendship is often paradoxical because 
“true friendship” cannot be interested (it would become in this case “vile calculation”), but 
the “bond of friendship” implies mutual exchanges of services and esteems. So, “while a 
friend is entitled to expect a return of his feelings and favours, he is not entitled to bestow 
them in that expectation”. The lack of reciprocity (of favours or esteem) leads to broke the 
bond and to a ‘re-alignment’ of personal relations”. The same could be said of the electoral 
exchange in Corsica: even if it can provide access to material resources and private 
advantages, it should not be presented as an interested act, but as the consequence of 
moral relationships between people. To put it in other terms, the demonstration of political 
loyalty (through the vote for example) is more significant in the intentions it reveals (the sign 
of a personal link) than in its materials consequences (the clientelistic favours and services). 
 
 
[3] 
 
The “moral economy” of the political links I’ve just described has been noticed in other 
contexts by social scientists and anthropologists as a key element of clientelistic 
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relationships. Shmuel Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger wrote for example in their handbook on 
clientelism that this phenomena is first of all “characterised by a simultaneous exchange of 
different types of resources – above all, instrumental and economic as well as political ones 
(supports, loyalty, votes, protection)”, but also by “a strong element of interpersonal 
obligation […] often couched in terms of personal loyalty and attachment”. Jeremy 
Boissevain, and other anthropologists of the Mediterranean communities (for example John 
Davis) have similarly underlined the importance of friendship and affective links in social 
groups in which the relationships are both instrumental and highly personalized. For most of 
them, these cultural codes of friendship and reciprocity help to legitimate the power and 
authority of the traditional political élites (in France, what we call the notables). In order to 
be accepted, the domination of the notables has to be supported by ideological 
justifications, one of them being that it is rooted in an exchange of mutual benefits. In Pierre 
Bourdieu’s terms, the language of reciprocity contribute to the transformation of economic 
domination in “symbolic domination” (that is a domination legitimated by moral 
justifications and founded on the denial of the economically-based dependencies).  
 
In such contexts, building a political reputation (a symbolic political capital) requires 
adopting types of conducts adjusted to the moral economy of clientelism. The power of the 
notables does not come from the population’s passive recognition of their somehow 
“natural” authority and socio-economic supremacy. It also followed form the active 
involvement of these notables in activities that generate and maintain the loyalty and 
allegiance of their voters. Among these activities, the distribution of clientelistic resources is 
crucial. Until the end of the nineteenth century, these resources were primarily related to 
land ownership. Economic management of the properties by the “big Corsican families of 
notables” was closely associated to the management of the family’s political capital and 
reputation. In a book published in 1887, the leader of one of these families described in this 
way the reasons and mechanisms of its political “supremacy”. 
 
“I give my life and, so to speak, my fortune to our clients and our clients give us their 
votes. That is our secret”. The same notable explained more precisely this “secret”: part 
of the family lands were leased to peasants (tenants) under “fairly mild conditions”; and 
the “rigorous payment of the rent was not always required”. Free grazing of herds in the 
properties of the family was “tolerated”, as well as wood gathering or hunting (but only 
for the “political friends” of the family). By this way, the family received “complete 
devotion” of hundreds of voters, linked to it by economic dependencies but also by 
“bonds of friendship, loyalty and gratitude” (P. Bourde, En Corse, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 
1887). 
 
The notables also granted individual assistance (monetary loans, charity) or collective 
assistance (small public works: fountains, roads constructions for instance). They interceded 
with the public authorities on behalf of their “clients” in case of trials, land or commercial 
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disputes. The power of the notables came in this case from their ability to redistribute some 
of their wealth in return for recognition of their dominant status – which was ratified by the 
political loyalty and the vote. For this, they not only need to possess resources they can 
distribute for clientelistic goals; but they also have to adopt conduct that bring them prestige 
and reputation (what Max Weber called “conducts of honour”) – conducts which 
demonstrate their generosity and sense of duty, which established their legitimacy and 
made so to speak “natural” and collectively accepted their “predestination to domination” 
(to use again Max Weber’s words). 
 
 
[4] 
 
In Corsica, this type of political organisation and “culture” has not disappeared with the 
political modernisation during the twentieth century. The new political élite which emerged 
with the republicanisation or Corsica in the late nineteenth century, coming from the local 
middle-class (doctors, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, etc.), adopted political practices very 
similar to those of the former notables. Access to local elected offices, to governmental 
institutions for the leaders of local parties, influence upon the state administrative agencies, 
etc., allowed them to control the new channels of public resources allocation, to manage 
clientelistic networks and to gain the political support of large part of the electorate through 
clientelistic exchanges. At the same time, with the democratisation of higher education and 
the opening of new channel of social mobility, these “new notables” accessed to prestigious 
social titles (university degrees, senior professional positions) allowing them to compete 
with the former notables in the domain of social esteem and individual prestige. In other 
words, modern forms of politics (open electoral competition, pluralism of parties and 
opinions, development of state intervention and public policies, etc.) were established in 
Corsica without producing any deep changes in the forms of political ties between voters 
and their elected representatives (clientelism) and with no radical transformation in the 
characteristic forms of exercising political power (the domination of the notables).  
 
Even in the second half of the nineteenth century, the regional development policies 
(agricultural planning, development of the public infrastructures and services, increase of 
public jobs, etc.) gave politicians access to new resources, which were often distributed 
through the channels of clientelistic networks. As Jean-François Médard pointed out, the 
functioning of the local government in post-war France encouraged the “mediating 
functions” of the local politicians and their “notabilisation”: acting as brokers between the 
state administrations and the community they represent, there are able to manage 
“informal networks” in order to provide “services to the community and to the individuals”, 
to reinforce in this way their “symbolic identification with the local community”, and to gain 
legitimacy by the mean of the “patronage relations” into this community. So, the clientelistic 
practices have adapted to political modernisation, i. e. to the establishment of the 
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institutions characteristic of “modern” politics: local public bureaucracies (the resources of 
which politicians sought to control and manage); political parties (formed largely on the 
basis of alliance networks powered by clientelistic exchanges); and open electoral 
competition (among parties and groups competing for access to clientelistic resources). 
 
 
[5] 
 
In such a context, political relationships can continue to be perceived, pricipally in the rural 
districts and villages, as personal relationships involving assistance and protection on the 
part of the politicians, gratitude and loyalty on the part of the voters. The terminology used 
to describe and valuate the political ties in the interviews generally refers to moral 
obligations and duties of friendship and gratitude, much more than of ideological and 
political categories. Intercession of local politician remains essential to many individuals, 
whether they need to find a job, to ask a “recommendation” in order to obtain 
administrative services, public subsidies or public contracts, etc. The act of voting or 
expressing political loyalty can be thus a strategic investment to obtain material benefits; 
but he has to be expressed as a result of solidarity bonds, duties of friendship, obligation of 
reciprocity. This does not appear to the individuals involved in such relationships as a 
contradiction: with regard to local beliefs of what constitute a legitimate political conduct, 
voting can both express and individual’s authentic commitment (based on friendship and 
loyalty) and satisfy material interests. In rural Corsica, this dimension is still deeply present: 
voting expresses for people their grounding in a community, their membership in groups 
that are at the same time “markers” of identity and networks of solidarity within which 
favours can be exchanged and the pragmatic transactions of everyday life can take place. 
 
Clientelism in this case cannot be considered as a political strategy to obtain political 
supports and to gain votes (as it tends to be in the recent mainstream literature about “vote 
buying”), but as a conduct adapted to the local cultural codes that legitimate the political 
and social relationships. The political reputation of a notable depends of his capability to act 
in accordance with these cultural codes, distributing services and favours and respecting 
social conventions that, in fact, deny the material and interested aspects of clientelistic 
exchanges. The mechanisms of the building and maintenance of political reputation are here 
very close to those of the building and maintenance of honour analysed by the 
anthropologists of Mediterranean world.. If, as stated by Julian Pitt-Rivers, honour is not 
only the “the value of a person in his own eyes”, his “claim to pride”, but also “the 
acknowledgement of that claim by the society”, the “recognition of excellence and prestige” 
inside the reference group, developing clientelistic strategies will mean to legitimately 
express this claim and have some chance to see it recognized and accepted by the voters. 
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For these voters, the vote and political loyalty is one of the manifestations of the recognition 
of the prestige and authority of the notables, but also a way to access resources and, at the 
same time, a way to achieve their “adjustment” to modern politics. By the means of the 
clientelistic exchanges, people gain access to rare resources (mainly those distributed by the 
state agencies via the notables) and turn therefore to their own advantage the electoral 
practices. The vote give them power – even if this power is partial and limited – over their 
political “patrons”, who are committed to “doing favours” and responding to their requests. 
As pointed out by Jean-François Bayart in a very different context from Corsica (the African 
context), “the principle of reciprocity institutionalized by the personalisation of social and 
political relations” is as much an instrument of power for the dominant élite as it is a means 
to force this élite to redistribute “the benefits of power”. By the means of the clientelistic 
exchanges, political activities and public policies become significant for the populations, 
because these activities and policies are closely linked to the stakes and issues of their 
everyday life that really matter to them. Clientelism appears thus to be one of the 
mechanisms of “control of their social condition” by subaltern classes described by Claude 
Grignon and Jean-Claude Passeron: a mechanism of appropriation and adjustment to the 
modern political institutions through their own cultural values, their own motivations and 
social interests. 
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* 
 
Abstract 
While established on the exchange of material benefits (goods and services in return for 
political support), clientelistic relationships involve inter-individual links, often expressed in 
terms of friendship, personal attachment and solidarity, sense of duty, or gratitude. People 
are expected to act according to moral obligations (providing favours to their allies for 
politicians; returning these favours with political loyalty for their electorate), at risk of losing 
their reputation and social status. Based on a fieldwork research on local politics in Corsica, 
the paper analyses these moral obligations and the way in which they influence on the one 
hand the exercise and legitimation of political authority, on the other hand the conception of 
political commitment and loyalty among ordinary citizens. It is argued that clientelism 
doesn’t manifest a “traditional” culture antagonistic to modern democratic standards, but 
results of the appropriation and reshaping of modern state institutions and electoral 
mechanisms by the local society.  
 
 
 
